### 1

#### The Asia pivot is the top of obamas agenda

Ewing 4-20 – POLITICO Pro's senior defense reporter. Previously, he was POLITICO's Pentagon correspondent (Philip, “Obama’s Asia pivot: A work in progress”, April 20 of 2014, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/04/barack-obama-asia-pivot-105842.html)

Administration officials bristle at the suggestion that they’re less than committed to the strategic shift; they insist it’s happening and will be effective — even with a smaller military. “Listen, the rebalance is at the front and center of our national security strategy, and it will continue to be so, even in the face of budget cuts,” said one senior defense official. “This is a part of the world that’s going to drive future prosperity and security, and we take that very seriously. I can’t comment on regional perceptions on the rebalance in the region. You’d have to ask those in the region.” Reporters did ask Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel about the perceptions of the defense ministers he met from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations this month in Hawaii, and he, too, said that Washington is serious. “I have been very clear and direct in what I’ve said about those fiscal restraints that we are dealing with,” he said — but the Defense Department is still doing a lot. It’s forward-deploying two more Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers to Japan, to help guard against potential attacks by North Korea. It’s also sending Japan another missile defense radar. The Navy is planning to keep up a rotation of Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. Defense officials have spent months negotiating the new rotational troop deployments to the Philippines. The Marine Corps is already rotating more Marines through Guam and has established a standing training deployment to Australia. What’s more, South Korea, Japan and Australia all plan to buy the American-made F-35 Lightning II fighter, which program backers say will create powerful new commonalities between their air forces and the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, all of which also will fly the new jet. So even if the U.S. military services do get smaller, the amount of friendly combat power in the region will stay the same or grow. And as for the problem of “distractions,” the administration says that Obama’s trip, following so close on the heels of Hagel’s visits to Japan, China and Mongolia, proves that the government’s senior-most leaders are paying close attention to Asia. “I think it’s pretty clear, even with budget restraints — we’ll live with those — this is a priority,” Hagel said. “And we’ll fulfill the commitments that we have made.” The U.S. also had a commitment to ensure the territorial integrity of Ukraine, however — which it hasn’t — and all but promised to punish Syria for crossing the “red line” of using chemical weapons — which it didn’t. The Wilson Center’s Hathaway rejected the idea that Obama’s decisions in those cases might have cost the U.S. credibility in the Asia context. Military action, he argued, might only have taken more attention away from the pivot.

#### The plan destabilizes Obama’s ability to handle the pivot and burns political capital.

Walt, 3/18 (Stephen, Professor of International Affairs @ Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, “The Solve-Everything, Do-Nothing White House,” 3/18/14, *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/18/the\_solve\_everything\_do\_nothing\_obama\_white\_house)

Contrary to the critical overreaction to Obama in the wake of events in Ukraine, what we are really seeing here is the classic problem of over-commitment -- in this case one that is more diplomatic than military in nature. U.S. officials like to claim they know how to walk and chew gum at the same time -- by which they mean they can handle more than one problem at once -- but trying to do too many things simultaneously leaves no bandwidth for dealing with the unexpected. It also forces top officials to rely heavily on subordinates who may not be good at their assigned tasks. Pursuing multiple objectives without a clear set of priorities also allows opponents to thwart your aims merely by dragging their feet and waiting until Washington is distracted by the next problem. This tactic also forces U.S. leaders to spend more political capital, which in turn leaves them weaker when other issues arise. And when you try to do too many things at once, steps taken to advance your aims in one area may undermine your efforts somewhere else.

#### **Effective strategic pivot to Asia is key to contain China`s rise and prevent several scenarios for nuclear conflict**

Colby 11 – Elbridge Colby, research analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, served as policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense’s Representative to the New START talks, expert advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, August 10, 2011, “Why the U.S. Needs its Liberal Empire,” The Diplomat, online: http://the-diplomat.com/2011/08/10/why-us-needs-its-liberal-empire/2/?print=yes

But the pendulum shouldn’t be allowed to swing too far toward an incautious retrenchment. For our problem hasn’t been overseas commitments and interventions as such, but the kinds of interventions. The US alliance and partnership structure, what the late William Odom called the United States’ ‘liberal empire’ that includes a substantial military presence and a willingness to use it in the defence of US and allied interests, remains a vital component of US security and global stability and prosperity. This system of voluntary and consensual cooperation under US leadership, particularly in the security realm, constitutes a formidable bloc defending the liberal international order. But, in part due to poor decision-making in Washington, this system is under strain, particularly in East Asia, where the security situation has become tenser even as the region continues to become the centre of the global economy. A nuclear North Korea’s violent behaviour threatens South Korea and Japan, as well as US forces on the peninsula; Pyongyang’s development of a road mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, moreover, brings into sight the day when North Korea could threaten the United States itself with nuclear attack, a prospect that will further imperil stability in the region. More broadly, the rise of China – and especially its rapid and opaque military build-up – combined with its increasing assertiveness in regional disputes is troubling to the United States and its allies and partners across the region. Particularly relevant to the US military presence in the western Pacific is the development of Beijing’s anti-access and area denial capabilities, including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, more capable anti-ship cruise missiles, attack submarines, attack aircraft, smart mines, torpedoes, and other assets. While Beijing remains a constructive contributor on a range of matters, these capabilities will give China the growing power to deny the United States the ability to operate effectively in the western Pacific, and thus the potential to undermine the US-guaranteed security substructure that has defined littoral East Asia since World War II. Even if China says today it won’t exploit this growing capability, who can tell what tomorrow or the next day will bring? Naturally, US efforts to build up forces in the western Pacific in response to future Chinese force improvements must be coupled with efforts to engage Beijing as a responsible stakeholder; indeed, a strengthened but appropriately restrained military posture will enable rather than detract from such engagement. In short, the United States must increase its involvement in East Asia rather than decrease it. Simply maintaining the military balance in the western Pacific will, however, involve substantial investments to improve US capabilities. It will also require augmented contributions to the common defence by US allies that have long enjoyed low defence budgets under the US security umbrella. This won’t be cheap, for these requirements can’t be met simply by incremental additions to the existing posture, but will have to include advances in air, naval, space, cyber, and other expensive high-tech capabilities. Yet such efforts are vital, for East Asia represents the economic future, and its strategic developments will determine which country or countries set the international rules that shape that economic future. Conversely, US interventions in the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, in south-eastern Europe have been driven by far more ambitious and aspirational conceptions of the national interest, encompassing the proposition that failing or illiberally governed peripheral states can contribute to an instability that nurtures terrorism and impedes economic growth. Regardless of whether this proposition is true, the effort is rightly seen by the new political tide not to be worth the benefits gained. Moreover, the United States can scale (and has scaled) back nation-building plans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans without undermining its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil and in preventing terrorism. The lesson to be drawn from recent years is not, then, that the United States should scale back or shun overseas commitments as such, but rather that we must be more discriminating in making and acting upon them. A total US unwillingness to intervene would pull the rug out from under the US-led structure, leaving the international system prey to disorder at the least, and at worst to chaos or dominance by others who could not be counted on to look out for US interests. We need to focus on making the right interventions, not forswearing them completely. In practice, this means a more substantial focus on East Asia and the serious security challenges there, and less emphasis on the Middle East. This isn’t to say that the United States should be unwilling to intervene in the Middle East. Rather, it is to say that our interventions there should be more tightly connected to concrete objectives such as protecting the free flow of oil from the region, preventing terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies, and forestalling or, if necessary, containing nuclear proliferation as opposed to the more idealistic aspirations to transform the region’s societies. These more concrete objectives can be better met by the more judicious and economical use of our military power. More broadly, however, it means a shift in US emphasis away from the greater Middle East toward the Asia-Pacific region, which dwarfs the former in economic and military potential and in the dynamism of its societies. The Asia-Pacific region, with its hard-charging economies and growing presence on the global stage, is where the future of the international security and economic system will be set, and it is there that Washington needs to focus its attention, especially in light of rising regional security challenges. In light of US budgetary pressures, including the hundreds of billions in ‘security’ related money to be cut as part of the debt ceiling deal, it’s doubly important that US security dollars be allocated to the most pressing tasks – shoring up the US position in the most important region of the world, the Asia-Pacific. It will also require restraint in expenditure on those challenges and regions that don’t touch so directly on the future of US security and prosperity. As Americans debate the proper US global role in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and Iraq and Afghanistan, they would do well to direct their ire not at overseas commitments and intervention as such, but rather at those not tied to core US interests and the sustainment and adaptation of the ‘liberal empire’ that we have constructed and maintained since World War II. Defenders of our important overseas links and activities should clearly distinguish their cause from the hyperactive and barely restrained approach represented by those who, unsatisfied with seeing the United States tied down in three Middle Eastern countries, seek intervention in yet more, such as Syria. Indeed, those who refuse to scale back US interventions in the Middle East or call for still more are directly contributing to the weakening of US commitments in East Asia, given strategic developments in the region and a sharply constrained budgetary environment in Washington. We can no longer afford, either strategically or financially, to squander our power in unnecessary and ill-advised interventions and nation-building efforts. The ability and will to intervene is too important to be so wasted.

#### **Unchecked Chinese rise causes great power nuclear war**

Walton 7 – C. Dale Walton, Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, 2007, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the 21st Century, p. 49

Obviously, it is of vital importance to the United States that the PRC does not become the hegemon of Eastern Eurasia. As noted above, however, regardless of what Washington does, China's success in such an endeavor is not as easily attainable as pessimists might assume. The PRC appears to be on track to be a very great power indeed, but geopolitical conditions are not favorable for any Chinese effort to establish sole hegemony; a robust multipolar system should suffice to keep China in check, even with only minimal American intervention in local squabbles. The more worrisome danger is that Beijing will cooperate with a great power partner, establishing a very muscular axis. Such an entity would present a critical danger to the balance of power, thus both necessitating very **active American intervention** in Eastern Eurasia and **creating the** underlying **conditions for a massive**, and probably **nuclear, great power war**. Absent such a "super-threat," however, the demands on American leaders will be far more subtle: creating the conditions for Washington's gentle decline from playing the role of unipolar quasi-hegemon to being "merely" the greatest of the world's powers, while aiding in the creation of a healthy multipolar system that is not marked by close great power alliances.

### 2

#### Engagement isn’t appeasement

Resnick 1 (Evan, Assistant Professor and coordinator of the United States Programme at RSIS, “Defining Engagement,” Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring2001, Vol. 54, Issue 2, <http://web.ebscohost.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/ehost/detail?sid=1b56e6b4-ade2-4052-9114-7d107fdbd019%40sessionmgr12&vid=2&hid=24&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=4437301>)

Thus, a rigid conceptual distinction can be drawn between engagement and appeasement. Whereas both policies are positive sanctions--insofar as they add to the power and prestige of the target state--engagement does so in a less direct and less militarized fashion than appeasement. In addition, engagement differs from appeasement by establishing an increasingly interdependent relationship between the sender and the target state. At any juncture, the sender state can, in theory, abrogate such a relationship at some (ideally prohibitive) cost to the target state.(n34) Appeasement, on the other hand, does not involve the establishment of contacts or interdependence between the appeaser and the appeased. Territory and/or a sphere of influence are merely transferred by one party to the other either unconditionally or in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the target state.

#### The AFF is appeasement

Barros et. al 9 (Andrew, Associate Professor of History at the University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada, Debating British Decisionmaking toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s, 2009, <http://fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/2009%20IS%201930s%20correspondence.pdf>)

Conventional definitions of appeasement generally emphasize the use of concessions to satisfy the adversary’s grievances, reduce tensions, and avoid war for the foreseeable future. We argued that these definitions narrowly equate appeasement with the dominant interpretation of British and French appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and neglect other forms of appeasement. They also fail to distinguish appeasement from other influence strategies involving concessions. These concerns led us to propose an alternative definition of appeasement as “a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions in response to a threat, with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term” (p. 154). We then distinguished three different types of appeasement strategies, based on the goals and expectations of the appeaser: (1) “resolving grievances” to create a lasting peace; (2) “diffusing secondary threats” to focus on a primary threat—by conserving resources, denying the primary adversary an important ally, or perhaps redirecting the hostility of the secondary threat toward the primary threat; and (3) “buying time” to prepare for (and perhaps deter) a possible military confrontation by rearming or securing allies. We used this typology to distinguish our buying-time interpretation of British appeasement policy toward Nazi Germany from a standard resolving grievances interpretation.

#### “Increase” means net increase

Words and Phrases 8(v. 20a, p. 264-265)

Cal.App.2 Dist. 1991. Term “increase,” as used in statute giving the Energy Commission modification jurisdiction over any alteration, replacement, or improvement of equipment that results in “increase” of 50 megawatts or more in electric generating capacity of existing thermal power plant, refers to “net increase” in power plant’s total generating capacity; in deciding whether there has been the requisite 50-megawatt increase as a result of new units being incorporated into a plant, Energy Commission cannot ignore decreases in capacity caused by retirement or deactivation of other units at plant. West’s Ann.Cal.Pub.Res.Code § 25123.

Vote NEG

1. Limits – justifies removing small restrictions on all countries which explodes limits – theyre key to clash

2. Ground – not increasing economic engagement means we don’t have any DA links because they aren’t specific to economic and they don’t increase it

### 3

#### Obama administration is hard-lining Cuba

Haven 13 (Paul, Associated Prices, NY Times, “Cuba, US try talking, but face many obstacles”, 6/21/13 http://www.timesherald.com/article/20130621/NEWS05/130629930/cuba-us-try-talking-but-face-many-obstacles#full\_story)

To be sure, there is still far more that separates the long-time antagonists than unites them. The State Department has kept Cuba on a list of state sponsors of terrorism and another that calls into question Havana’s commitment to fighting human trafficking. The Obama administration continues to demand democratic change on an island ruled for more than a half century by Castro and his brother Fidel. For its part, Cuba continues to denounce Washington’s 51-year-old economic embargo. And then there is Gross, the 64-year-old Maryland native who was arrested in 2009 and is serving a 15-year jail sentence for bringing communications equipment to the island illegally. His case has scuttled efforts at engagement in the past, and could do so again, U.S. officials say privately. Cuba has indicated it wants to trade Gross for four Cuban agents serving long jail terms in the United States, something Washington has said it won’t consider. Ted Henken, a professor of Latin American studies at Baruch College in New York who helped organize a recent U.S. tour by Cuban dissident blogger Yoani Sanchez, said the Obama administration is too concerned with upsetting Cuban-American politicians and has missed opportunities to engage with Cuba at a crucial time in its history. “I think that a lot more would have to happen for this to amount to momentum leading to any kind of major diplomatic breakthrough,” he said. “Obama should be bolder and more audacious.” Even these limited moves have sparked fierce criticism by those long opposed to engagement. Cuban-American congressman Mario Diaz Balart, a Florida Republican, called the recent overtures “disturbing.” “Rather than attempting to legitimize the Cuban people’s oppressors, the administration should demand that the regime stop harboring fugitives from U.S. justice, release all political prisoners and American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross, end the brutal, escalating repression against the Cuban people, and respect basic human rights,” he said.

#### The plan is appeasement.

Walser 12 – Ph.D. and a Senior Policy Analyst at The Heritage Foundation (Ray, “Cuban-American Leaders: “No Substitute for Freedom” in Cuba”, June 25 of 2012, <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/06/25/cuban-american-leaders-no-substitute-for-freedom-in-cuba/>)

However, these pleasing liberal assumptions are negated on a daily basis by hard-headed facts on the ground in Cuba. With each new step lifting restrictions on travel and remittances have come more demands for additional actions—not a reciprocal loosening of the regime’s grip on its citizens.¶ A one-of a-kind letter entitled “Commitment to Freedom,” signed by a distinguished battery of Cuban-American former senior executives for Fortune 500 companies and released on June 25, advises Washington and the Obama Administration to curb its enthusiasm for a policy of appeasement and concessions. It warns against falling for the Castro regime’s deceptive campaign to secure U.S. capital infusion and bank credits and lure some Cuban-American businessmen without ushering in a true economic and political opening.¶ The former CEOs argue that recent economic reforms heralded as game-changing are, in fact, “mostly cosmetic, heavily-taxed and revocable, and offer no legal protection or investment return.” The letter’s signatories further warn that the Castro regime “is seeking to divide and neutralize the Cuban-American community, and lure some of its businessmen, by selling the fallacious concept that there is no solution to Cuba’s predicament other than supporting cosmetic reforms without liberty and democracy.”¶ They are correct when they say the future “lies not with the current failed, octogenarian rulers, but with the leaders of the growing pro-democracy movement.”¶ The Obama Administration policy aimed at easing travel and remittances to Cuba has visibly failed to advance genuine economic or political freedom. With the unjust detention of American Alan Gross and the continual crackdown on dissent and protest, the regime cannot hide its iron fist of political repression.¶ It is time to take a tougher look at the shortcomings of U.S. Cuba policy and remind ourselves, as these former CEOs do, that when it comes to ending the tyranny of the Castro regime, there is “no substitute for freedom.”

#### Appeasement triggers multiple scenarios for nuclear– it is only a question of perception

Hanson 9 - American military historian, columnist and the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution (Victor, “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis Hanson”, December 7 of 2009, Interview between Bernard Chapin and Hanson, <http://pjmedia.com/blog/change-weakness-disaster-obama-answers-from-victor-davis-hanson/>)

BC: Are we currently sending a message of weakness to our foes and allies? Can anything good result from President Obama’s marked submissiveness before the world?¶ Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc.¶ BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage?¶ Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when.

### 4

The plan kills the friend/enemy distinction – that causes war and extinction

Strong 7-Distinguished Professor of Political Science @ Harvard, PhD in Political Science @ Harvard [Tracy, Foreword: Dimensions of the New Debate about Carl Schmitt, from The Concept of the Political, 2007, pg. xx-xxiii, DKP] Gender edited

In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt identifies as the "high points of politics" those moments in which "the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy." He suggests that this is true both theoretically and in practice. 36 There are two aspects of this claim worthy of note. The first is the semi-Hegelian form it assumes. The concrete recognition of the other as enemy and the consequent establishment of one's own identity sounds something like Hegel's Master and Slave, especially if read through a Kojevian lens. I suspect, in fact, that it is this aspect which led the SS journal Das Schwarze Korps to accuse Schmitt of neo-Hegelianism. 37 But only the form is Hegelian. There are two elements in Schmitt's claim about enemies which are not Hegelian. First is a suggestion that unless one is clear about the fundamental non-rationality of politics, one will likely be overtaken by events. Following the passage about the "high points of politics," Schmitt goes on to give examples of those who were clear about what was friend and enemy and those who were not. He cites as clear-headed some German opponents of Napoleon; Lenin in his condemnation of capitalism; and-most strikingly-Cromwell in his enmity toward Spain. He contrasts these men to "the doomed classes [who] romanticized the Russian peasant," and to the "aristocratic society in France before the Revolution of 1789 [who] sentimentalized 'man who is by nature good.' "38 The implication here is that rationality-what is rational for a group to do to preserve itself as a group-is not only not universal but hard to know. We are not far here from Alasdair MacIntyre's Whose Justice? Whose Rationality?39 The important aspect to Schmitt's claim is that it is by facing the friend-enemy distinction that we (a "we") will be able to be clear about what "we" are and what it is "rational" for "us" to do. Schmitt insists in his discussion of the friend-enemy distinction on the public nature of the categories. It is not my enemy but our enemy; that is, "enemy" is a political concept. Here Schmitt enlists the public quality to politics in order to prevent a universalism which he thinks extremely dangerous. The argument goes like this. Resistance to or the refusal to accept the fact that one's rational action has limitations determined by the quality of the identity of one's group leads to two possible outcomes. The first is that one assumes one shares with others universal qualities which must then "naturally" engender an ultimate convergence of interests attainable through negotiation and compromise. Here events are most likely not only to prove one wrong but to destroy a group that acts on such a false belief. (One thinks of Marx's caustic comments about the social-democrats in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon). This is the case with the "doomed" Russian classes and the "aristocratic society" of France. The other, more dangerous possibility is that one will claim to speak in the name of universal humanity. In such a case, all those by whom one is opposed must perforce be seen as speaking against humanity and hence can only merit to be exterminated. Schmitt writes: Humanity as such and as a whole has no enemies. Everyone belongs to humanity . . . "Humanity" thus becomes an asymmetrical counter-concept. If he or she discriminates within humanity and thereby denies the quality of being human to a disturber or destroyer, then the negatively valued person becomes an unperson, and his life is no longer of the highest value: it becomes worthless and must be destroyed. Concepts such as "human being" thus contain the possibility of the deepest inequality and become thereby "asymmetrical.,,4o These words were written in 1976, but they were prepared for in the conclusion to The Concept of the Political: "The adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity."41 Schmitt wants here to remove from politics, especially international politics but also internal politics of an ideological kind, any possibility of justifying one's action on the basis of a claim to universal moral principles. He does so because he fears that in such a framework all claims to good will recognize no limits to their reach. And, thus, this century will see "wars for the domination of the earth" (the phrase is Nietzsche's in Ecce Homo), that is, wars to determine once and for all what is good for all, wars with no outcome except an end to politics and the elimination of all difference.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s ethics of obligation and inclusion. Only endorsement of enmity opens political space for pluralization of political difference, ending the perpetuation of violence.

#### The war on terror is only possible by denying authentic relations of enmity between ourselves and the terrorist ---they have legitimate political grievances, so the proper solution is the alternative’s level political playing field that allows for the productive expression of opposition between “us and them”

Prozorov 6 – Sergei Prozorov, collegium fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Professor of International Relations in the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Politics and Social Sciences, Petrozavodsk State University, Russia, 2006, “Liberal Enmity: The Figure of the Foe in the Political Ontology of Liberalism,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, p. 75-99

The present hegemony of liberal ultra-politics is well illustrated by the contemporary phenomenon of the global ‘war on terror’. The ‘war on terror’ offers a fruitful site for inquiring into the politics of enmity for two reasons. First, the widely perceived undecidability of the category of ‘terrorism’ to the extent that it is frequently attributed to the very same states that have launched the ‘war on terror’ illuminates starkly the contingency of the friend–enemy distinction. This contingency, i.e. the absence of both essence and necessity to any particular empirical form of enmity, points to the permanent gap between the transcendental function of the friend–enemy distinction and its particular historical modality. The deployment of the ultra-political objectification of the enemy as a terrorist ‘rogue’ is a purely contingent option, made possible by a fundamental asymmetry that endows the subjects of the ‘war on terror’ with what Derrida terms the ‘reason of the strongest’, an epistemico-moral self-certitude that itself has something roguish about it: [T]hose states that are able or are in a state to denounce or accuse some ‘rogue state’ of violating the law, of failing to live up to the law, of being guilty of some perversion or deviation, those states that claim to uphold international law and that take the initiative of war, of police or peacekeeping operations because they have the force to do so, are themselves, as sovereign, the first rogue states. This is true even before any evidence is gathered to make a case against them, however useful and enlightening such a case may be. There are always (no) more rogue states than one thinks.70 Secondly and consequently, the ‘war on terror’ is of particular interest, insofar as the perception of this fundamental inequality is arguably constitutive of the very subject-position of the ‘terrorist’ foe. Indeed, contemporary terrorist violence may be grasped as a retort of the foe, a paradoxical refusal of the subject-position, imposed on the enemy of liberalism, through its assumption in a hyperbolic and excessive manner, whereby the foe ‘acts out’, with a vengeance, an identity attributed to him or her. Let us suggest that the specificity of terrorist violence is not derivative of extra-political factors that may function as its background motives (poverty, economic inequality, underdevelopment, lack of education, etc.), but is rather a direct expression of a properly political grievance, a retort against the humiliation, incurred in not being recognised as a legitimate enemy. Our demonstration of the monistic nature of liberal pluralism and the artefactual character of liberal naturalism points to the fact that the subject-position of the foe is preconstituted in the political ontology of liberalism, insofar as the appropriation of the capacity to adjudicate what is human and what, within humanity, is natural makes exclusion and stigmatisation a permanently available option for dealing with expressions of dissent. The image of the terrorist foe is thus both entirely contingent from the standpoint of a Schmittian transcendental function of enmity and always-already articulated within the ontological edifice of liberalism. While the motives for particular acts of terrorism might be distinct in each particular case, we may suggest that all these acts, first, take place in the preconstituted subject position of the ‘enemy of liberalism’ and, secondly, target precisely this subject position as a priori inferior. Terrorism is little more and nothing less than the resentful acceptance by the Other of the ultra-political terms of engagement, if only because there is no other way that the present global order can be legitimately opposed: the refusal to be liberalism’s ‘noble savage’ inevitably turns one into a barbarian. If our enemy can only be a monster, should we be surprised that the acts of our enemies are so monstrous? The uncanny effect of the liberal negation of pluralistic antagonism is that in the eyes of its adversaries liberalism may no longer be opposed other than by murderous and meaningless destruction. To the oft-cited empirical claims that contemporary terrorism has been produced as an effect of Cold War policies of Western powers, we must add a conceptual thesis: terrorism is the practical expression of that mode of enmity which the liberal West has constituted as the sole political possibility due to its appropriation of both nature and humanity. The ‘war on terror’ is not an accidental deviation from the maxims of Western liberalism but rather an exemplary model of the only kind of ‘war’ that the liberal foreclosure of political enmity permits, i.e. a war against an a priori ‘unjust enemy’. It should therefore not be surprising to see this model generalised beyond its original articulation, whereby it becomes a standard response to the worldwide expressions of anti-liberal dissent. For this reason, one gains nothing by attempting to battle terrorism either on its constitutive ultra-political terms or, as much of critical thought suggests, on the extra-political fronts of development, poverty relief, civic education, democratisation, etc. Instead, any authentic confrontation with terrorism must logically pass through the stage of questioning what confrontation, struggle and antagonism actually mean today, who we fight, how we fight and, possibly, whether we still have any meaningful willingness to fight. During the 1970s, Foucault frequently lamented that the proverbial ‘class struggle’ tended to be theorised in critical thought in terms of ‘class’ rather than ‘struggle’, the latter term functioning as a mere metaphor.71 The same problem is still with us today – the proliferation of metaphors (‘culture wars’, ‘wars on drugs’, ‘fight against poverty’) is increasingly obscuring the reflection on the concrete meaning of antagonism in contemporary political life. In the interbellum of the 1990s, one frequently encountered discussions of who the new enemy might be after the demise of the Soviet Union. As subsequent events have demonstrated, it is entirely redundant to attempt a theoretical deduction of the concrete enemy, which is after all always constituted in a political decision. However, while the ‘who’ question may be entrusted to history and politics, what requires reflection is a question of how enmity is to be managed. Should we maintain the present ultra-politics of the foe despite its evident boomerang effects on our societies, or should we attempt to return to the structure of ‘legitimate enmity’ of the Westphalian era, expanding it beyond the European system to the entire international society? Should we put our trust in and surrender our freedom to the governmental apparatuses of ‘homeland security’ or should we heed Schmitt’s warning that no security may ever be attained as long as our sense of the world is that in which there is ‘only a homeland’? This article has demonstrated that it is impossible to evade these questions by the plethoric yet repetitive discourse on overcoming enmity in the chimerical project of ‘world unity’ and that answers to these questions require an interrogation of many ontological assumptions that frame the conduct of modern liberal politics. We have seen that the desire to dispense with enmity as such, arising out of liberal epistemicomoral certitude, has not brought about a ‘universal friendship’ but rather produced a limited but universalistic community, which permanently feels threatened due to its incomplete embrace of the globe and, for the same reason, threatens everyone outside itself. The escape from the murderous ultra-politics of the foe is impossible unless it passes through the stage of an ontological critique of liberalism, hence the present importance of Schmitt.

### 5

#### Text: The United States federal government should eliminate the enforcement of all restrictions on economic engagement between the U.S. and Cuba mandated by Cuba’s inclusion on the ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ list, other than restrictions related to U.S. arms sales to Cuba. The United States federal government should clarify that it no longer considers Cuba a state sponsor of terrorism, and that it retains legal restrictions related to such designation only as a means to restrain its own arms sales.

#### Competes---the CP doesn’t take Cuba off the list, it just eliminates all the economic restrictions that are caused by their inclusion on the list, other than the ban on arms sales.

#### Removing Cuba from the list would include lifting restrictions on U.S. arms sales

AP 13 – Associated Press, 3/23/13, “US on verge of momentous Cuba decision: Whether to take island off controversial terror list,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/03/23/us-on-verge-momentous-cuba-decision-whether-to-take-island-off-controversial/

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry must decide within a few weeks whether to advocate that President Barack Obama should take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.

Cuban officials have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American delegations privately in recent weeks that they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus test for improved ties. They also hinted the decision could affect discussions over the release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross, whose detention in 2009 torpedoed hopes of a diplomatic thaw.

Inclusion on the list means a ban not only on arms sales to Cuba but also on items that can have dual uses, including some hospital equipment. It also requires that the United States oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending institutions, among other measures.

#### Net-Beneficial---arms sales sustain global U.S. militarism and invisible structural violence---enforcing legal restrictions is key

Andrew Gavin Marshall 13, head of the Geopolitics division of the Hampton Institute, 3/26/13, “In the Arms of Dictators: America the Great… Global Arms Dealer,” http://andrewgavinmarshall.com/2013/03/26/in-the-arms-of-dictators-america-the-great-global-arms-dealer/

The American imperial system incorporates much more than supporting the occasional coup or undertaking the occasional war. Coups, wars, assassinations and other forms of overt and covert violence and destabilization, while relatively common and consistent for the United States – compared to other major powers – are secondary to the general maintenance of a system of imperial patronage. A “stable” system is what is desired most by strategic planners and policy-makers, but this has a technical definition. Stability means that the populations of subject nations and regions are under “control” – whether crushed by force or made passive by consent, while Western corporate and financial interests have and maintain unhindered access to the “markets” and resources of those nations and regions. Since the 19th century development of America’s overseas empire, this has been referred to as the “Open Door” policy: as in, the door opens for American and other Western economic interests to have access to and undertake exploitation of resources and labour.

As the only global imperial power, and by far the world’s largest military power, America does not merely rely upon the “goodwill” of smaller nations or the threat of force against them in order to maintain its dominance, it has established, over time, a large and complex network of imperial patronage: supplying economic aid, military aid (to allow its favoured regimes to control their own populations or engage in proxy-warfare), military and police training, among many other programs. These programs are largely coordinated by and between the Defense Department, State Department, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Arms sales are a major method through which the United States – and other powerful nations – are able to exert their hegemony, by arming and strengthening their key allies, directly or indirectly fueling civil wars and conflicts, and funneling money into the world’s major weapons manufacturers. The global economic crisis had “significantly pushed down purchases of weapons” over 2009 to the lowest level since 2005. In 2009, worldwide arms deals amounted to $57.5 billion, dropping 8.5% from the previous year. The United States maintained its esteemed role as the main arms dealer in the world, accounting for $22.6 billion – or 39% of the global market. In 2008, the U.S. contribution to global arms sales was significantly higher, at $38.1 billion, up from $25.7 billion in 2007. In 2009, the second-largest arms dealer in the world was Russia at $10.4 billion, then France at $7.4 billion, followed by Germany, Italy, China and Britain.[1]

There are two official ways in which arms are sold to foreign nations: either through Foreign Military Sales (FMS), in which the Pentagon negotiates an agreement between the U.S. government and a foreign government for the sale and purchase of arms, and through Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), in which arms manufacturers (multinational corporations) negotiate directly with foreign governments for the sale and purchase of arms, having to apply for a license from the State Department.

### Case

#### Security threats real – US must hardline Cuba after weapons sales to North Korea discovered

Miami Herald 13

(Miami Herald, Editorial, July 21 2013, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/21/3512459/cuba-north-korea-and-the-chong.html>, Accessed July 21, 2013, JD)

The seizure in Panama of the Chong Chon Gang, a rusty old North Korean ship carrying last century’s Soviet-era weapons from Cuba hidden under 250,000 sacks of brown sugar, may seem to have the wacky trappings of a Gilligan’s Island episode with a Cold War flashback that includes a rioting crew and a captain threatening to kill himself when Panamanian soldiers boarded his ship.¶ But as the ship’s containers begin to be cleared of the 100-pound bags of sugar and the weapons systems are exposed and analyzed by experts, no one’s laughing. The case for maintaining a tough line on North Korea and Cuba has been strengthened.¶ The Obama administration, which has spent years tossing carrots at both communist countries, keeps finding that neither wants to nibble. They’re too busy, after all, plotting against the United States and the United Nations.¶ Any talk of removing the communist island from the State Department’s terror list remains a fool’s errand when faced with more evidence of Cuba’s role as a pass-through for every renegade nation and terrorist group that seeks harbor there.¶ The Cuban and North Korean communist dictatorships maintain Cuba was sending “obsolete defensive weapons” for repairs in North Korea so that Cuba can “protect its sovereignty.” Among the 240 metric tons of weapons are two anti-aircraft missile systems, nine missiles “in parts and spares,” two Mig-21 bis jet fighters and 15 engines, the Cubans say.¶ But if the weapons are obsolete why repair them? In fact, a key radar component of the SA-2 surface-to-air defense system on the ship can still be used once upgraded to ward off newer Western systems that can disable the old SA-2, surface-to-air missiles designed for higher elevations like North Korea’s. Were these weapons headed for North Korea to spruce up for its own use now that neighboring China has toughened its position against Pyongyang?¶ North Korea’s arms deal with Cuba violates United Nations security resolutions that prohibit the Asian renegade from dealing in arms. The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions against North Korea after its first illegal nuclear test in 2006 and again in 2009, sanctions that authorize inspections of ships at sea. Yet North Korea was removed from the U.S. State Department’s terror list in 2008 after it agreed to international inspection of its nuclear program. Time has shown that this promise was made to be broken.¶ U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and past chair, is right to call for North Korea to be put back on the terror list. And those hoping to get Cuba pulled off the terror list should have gotten their wake-up call about the Castro brothers’ ill will, too.¶ As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez noted, “Weapons transfers from one communist regime to another hidden under sacks of sugar are not accidental occurrences and reinforce the necessity that Cuba remain on the State Department’s list of countries that sponsor state terrorism. In addition to possible violations of Panamanian law, the shipment almost certainly violated United Nations Security Council sanctions on shipments of weapons to North Korea and as such, I call on the Obama administration to submit this case to the U.N. Security Council for review.”¶ This is no time to be chummy with rogue regimes. Keep Cuba where it belongs — on the terror list — and add North Korea to the membership because both countries have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted.

#### Cuba sponsors terrorist organizations.

Claver-Carone 13

(Mauricio Claver-Carone, former US Treasury Department Attorney-advisor, “Cuba Sees an Opening,” The American, April 4 2013, [www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism](http://www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism), Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)

The United States designates ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations and Cuba continues to provide support for both groups. The favorite new argument of those seeking Cuba’s removal from the list is to note that peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC are taking place in Havana. But the United States would need to rescind its designation of ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations before it could remove Cuba from the terrorism sponsor list. More importantly, there is no peace agreement or peace in Colombia and ETA continues to threaten Spain.

#### Reps of terror in the real world are accurate depictions – prefer scholars

Michael J. Boyle 8, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. **An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological** **problems**. In fact**, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own** searching **critiques** of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). **Some of those scholars** most associated with the critique of empiricismimplied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ **have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism**. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by **Schmid and Jongman** (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they **point out** that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the **failure to address** persistent conceptual and **data problems** has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, **Silke’s** (2004) **volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function**, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. **A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.**

**Consequences matter – the tunnel vision of moral absolutism generates evil and political irrelevance**

Issac, 2002 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)

Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, **an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: **(1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends.** Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but **if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters**; **(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity** is not simply a form of powerlessness, it **is often a form of complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives** of action, **that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil.** **This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic** and historically contextualized **ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment.** It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. **And it undermines political effectiveness.**

#### Violence is proximately caused – root cause logic is poor scholarship

Sharpe 10, lecturer, philosophy and psychoanalytic studies, and Goucher, senior lecturer, literary and psychoanalytic studies – Deakin University, ‘10

(Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 231 – 233)

We realise that this argument, which we propose as a new ‘quilting’ framework to explain Žižek’s theoretical oscillations and political prescriptions, raises some large issues of its own. While this is not the place to further that discussion, we think its analytic force leads into a much wider critique of ‘Theory’ in parts of the latertwentieth- century academy, which emerged following the ‘cultural turn’ of the 1960s and 1970s in the wake of the collapse of Marxism.Žižek’s paradigm to try to generate all his theory of culture, subjectivity, ideology, politics and religion is psychoanalysis. But a similar criticism would apply, for instance, to theorists who feel that the method JacquesDerrida developed for criticising philosophical texts can meaningfully supplant the methodologies of political science, philosophy, economics, sociology and so forth, when it comes to thinking about ‘the political’. Or, differently, thinkers who opt for Deleuze (or Deleuze’s and Guattari’s) Nietzschean Spinozism as a new metaphysics to explain ethics,politics, aesthetics, ontology and so forth, seem to us candidates for the same type of criticism, as a reductive passing over the empirical and analytic distinctness of the different object fields in complex societies. In truth, we feel that Theory, and the continuing line of ‘master thinkers’ who regularly appear particularly in the English- speaking world, is the last gasp of what used to be called First Philosophy. The philosopher ascends out of the city, Plato tells us, from whence she can espie the Higher Truth, which she must then bring back down to political earth. From outside the city, we can well imagine that she can see much more widely than her benighted politicalcontemporaries. But from these philosophical heights, we can equally suspect that the ‘master thinker’ is also alwaysin danger of passing over the salient differences and features of political life – differences only too evident to people ‘on the ground’. Political life, after all, is always a more complex affair than a bunch of ideologically duped fools staring atand enacting a wall (or ‘politically correct screen’) of ideologically produced illusions, from Plato’s timeless cave allegory to Žižek’s theory of ideology. We know that Theory largely understands itself as avowedly ‘post- metaphysical’. It aims to erect its new claims on the gravestone of First Philosophy as the West has known it. But it also tells us that people very often do not know what they do. And so it seems to us that too many of its proponents and their followers are mourners who remain in the graveyard, propping up the gravestone of Western philosophy under the sign of some totalising account ofabsolutely everything – enjoyment, différance, biopower . . . Perhaps the time has come, we would argue, less for one more would- be global, allpurpose existential and political Theory than for a multi- dimensional and interdisciplinary critical theory that would challenge the chaotic specialisation neoliberalism speeds up in academe, which mirrors and accelerates the splintering of the Left over the last four decades. This would mean that we would have to shun the hope that one method, one perspective, or one master thinker could single- handedly decipher all the complexity of socio- political life, the concerns of really existing social movements – which specifi cally does not mean mindlessly celebrating difference, marginalisation and multiplicity as if they could be suffi cient ends for a new politics. It would be to reopen critical theory and non- analytic philosophy to the other intellectual disciplines, most of whom todaypointedly reject Theory’s legitimacy, neither reading it nor taking it seriously.

#### Ideology breeds terrorism and will continue to indefinitely – only way to prevent future acts of violence is hard-line militarism by the United States

Alex Epstein, Graduate of Duke University, BA Philosophy, Junior fellow at the Ayn Rand Institute, “Fight the Root of Terrorism With Bombs, Not Bread,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 2005, http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11243,

The pernicious idea that poverty causes terrorism has been a popular claim since the attacks of September 11. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has repeatedly asked wealthy nations to double their foreign aid, naming as a cause of terrorism "that far too many people are condemned to lives of extreme poverty and degradation." Former Secretary of State Colin Powell agrees: "We have to put hope back in the hearts of people. We have to show people who might move in the direction of terrorism that there is a better way." Businessman Ted Turner also concurs: "The reason that the World Trade Center got hit is because there are a lot of people living in abject poverty out there who don't have any hope for a better life." Indeed, the argument that poverty causes terrorism has been central to America’s botched war in Iraq--which has focused, not on quickly ending any threat the country posed and moving on to other crucial targets, but on bringing the good life to the Iraqi people. Eliminating the root of terrorism is indeed a valid goal--but properly targeted military action, not welfare handouts, is the means of doing so. Terrorism is not caused by poverty. The terrorists of September 11 did not attack America in order to make the Middle East richer. To the contrary, their stated goal was to repel any penetration of the prosperous culture of the industrialized "infidels" into their world. The wealthy Osama bin Laden was not using his millions to build electric power plants or irrigation canals. If he and his terrorist minions wanted prosperity, they would seek to emulate the United States--not to destroy it. More fundamental, poverty as such cannot determine anyone's code of morality. It is the ideas that individuals choose to adopt which make them pursue certain goals and values. A desire to destroy wealth and to slaughter innocent, productive human beings cannot be explained by a lack of money or a poor quality of life--only by anti-wealth, anti-life ideas. These terrorists are motivated by the ideology of Islamic Fundamentalism. This other-worldly, authoritarian doctrine views America's freedom, prosperity, and pursuit of worldly pleasures as the height of depravity. Its adherents resent America's success, along with the appeal its culture has to many Middle Eastern youths. To the fundamentalists, Americans are "infidels" who should be killed. As a former Taliban official said, "The Americans are fighting so they can live and enjoy the material things in life. But we are fighting so we can die in the cause of God." The terrorists hate us because of their ideology--a fact that filling up the coffers of Third World governments will do nothing to change. What then, can our government do? It cannot directly eradicate the deepest, philosophical roots of terrorism; but by using military force, it can eliminate the only "root cause" relevant in a political context: state sponsorship of terrorism. The fundamentalists' hostility toward America can translate into international terrorism only via the governments that employ, finance, train, and provide refuge to terrorist networks. Such assistance is the cause of the terrorist threat--and America has the military might to remove that cause. It is precisely in the name of fighting terrorism at its root that America must extend its fist, not its hand. Whatever other areas of the world may require U.S. troops to stop terrorist operations, we must above all go after the single main source of the threat--Iran. This theocratic nation is both the birthplace of the Islamic Fundamentalist revolution and, as a consequence, a leading sponsor of terrorism. Removing that government from power would be a potent blow against Islamic terrorism. It would destroy the political embodiment of the terrorists' cause. It would declare America's intolerance of support for terrorists. It would be an unequivocal lesson, showing what will happen to other countries if they fail to crack down on terrorists within their borders. And it would acknowledge the fact that dropping bombs, not food packages, is the only way for our government to attack terrorism at its root.

#### Predictive models good—prevents future catastrophe

**Kurasawa, 2004** – Associate Professor of Sociology at York University (Fuyuki, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight”, Constellations Volume 11, Issue 4, December 2004)

In the twenty-first century, **the lines of political cleavage are being drawn along those of competing dystopian visions**. Indeed, one of the notable features of **recent public discourse** **and socio-political struggle** **is** their **negationist hue, for they are devoted as much to the prevention of disaster as to the realization of the good,** **less to what ought to be than what could but must not be**. **The debates that preceded the war in Iraq** **provide** a vivid **illustration** of this tendency, **as both camps rhetorically invoked incommensurable catastrophic scenarios to make their respective cases.** And as many analysts have noted, the multinational antiwar protests culminating on February 15, 2003 marked the first time that a mass movement was able to mobilize substantial numbers of people dedicated to averting war before it had actually broken out. More generally, given past experiences and awareness of what might occur in the future, **given the cries of ‘never again’** (the Second World War, the Holocaust, Bhopal, Rwanda, etc.) **and ‘not ever’** (e.g., nuclear or ecological apocalypse, human cloning) **that are emanating** from different parts of the world, **the avoidance of crises is seemingly on everyone’s lips - and everyone’s conscience**. From the United Nations and regional multilateral organizations to states, from non-governmental organizations to transnational social movements, **the determination to prevent the actualization of potential cataclysms has become a new imperative in world affairs. Allowing past disasters to reoccur and unprecedented calamities to unfold is now widely seen as unbearable when,** in the process, **the suffering of future generations is callously tolerated and our survival is being irresponsibly jeopardized.** Hence, we need to pay attention to what a widely circulated report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identifies **as a burgeoning “culture of prevention**,”3 **a dynamic that carries major, albeit still poorly understood, normative and political implications. Rather than bemoaning the contemporary preeminence of a dystopian imaginary**, I am claiming that it can enable a novel form of transnational socio-political action, a manifestation of globalization from below that can be termed preventive foresight. We should not reduce the latter to a formal principle regulating international relations or an ensemble of policy prescriptions for official players on the world stage, **since it is**, just as significantly, **a mode of ethico-political practice enacted by participants in the emerging realm of global civil society**. In other words, what I want to underscore is **the work of farsightedness, the social processes through which civic associations are simultaneously** constituting and putting into practice a sense of responsibility for the future by attempting to prevent global catastrophes. Although the labor of preventive foresight takes place in varying political and socio-cultural settings - and with different degrees of institutional support and access to symbolic and material resources - it is underpinned by three distinctive features: dialogism, publicity, and transnationalism. In the first instance, **preventive foresight is an intersubjective or dialogical process of address, recognition, and response between two parties in global civil** **society: the ‘warners,’ who anticipate and send out word of possible perils, and the audiences being warned, those who heed their interlocutors’ messages by demanding that governments and/or international organizations take measures to steer away from** **disaster**. Secondly, **the work of farsightedness derives its effectiveness and legitimacy from public debate and deliberation.** This is not to say that a fully fledged global public sphere is already in existence, since transnational “strong publics” with decisional power in the formal-institutional realm are currently embryonic at best. Rather, in this context, publicity signifies that “weak publics” with distinct yet occasionally overlapping constituencies are coalescing around struggles to avoid specific global catastrophes.4 Hence, despite having little direct decision-making capacity, the environmental and peace movements, humanitarian NGOs, and other similar globally-oriented civic associations are becoming significant actors involved in public opinion formation. Groups like these are active in disseminating information and alerting citizens about looming catastrophes, lobbying states and multilateral organizations from the ‘inside’ and pressuring them from the ‘outside,’ as well as fostering public participation in debates about the future. This brings us to the transnational character of preventive foresight, which is most explicit in the now commonplace observation that we live in an interdependent world because of the globalization of the perils that humankind faces (nuclear annihilation, global warming, terrorism, genocide, AIDS and SARS epidemics, and so on); individuals and groups from far-flung parts of the planet are being brought together into “risk communities” that transcend geographical borders.5 Moreover, due to dense media and information flows, knowledge of impeding catastrophes can instantaneously reach the four corners of the earth - sometimes well before individuals in one place experience the actual consequences of a crisis originating in another. My contention is that civic associations are engaging in dialogical, public, and transnational forms of ethico-political action that contribute to the creation of a fledgling global civil society existing ‘below’ the official and institutionalized architecture of international relations.6 The work of preventive foresight consists of forging ties between citizens; participating in the circulation of flows of claims, images, and information across borders; promoting an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism; and forming and mobilizing weak publics that debate and struggle against possible catastrophes. Over the past few decades, states and international organizations have frequently been content to follow the lead of globally-minded civil society actors, who have been instrumental in placing on the public agenda a host of pivotal issues (such as nuclear war, ecological pollution, species extinction, genetic engineering, and mass human rights violations). To my mind, this strongly indicates that if prevention of global crises is to eventually rival the assertion of short-term and narrowly defined rationales (national interest, profit, bureaucratic self-preservation, etc.), weak publics must begin by convincing or compelling official representatives and multilateral organizations to act differently; only then will farsightedness be in a position to ‘move up’ and become institutionalized via strong publics.7 Since the global culture of prevention remains a work in progress, the argument presented in this paper is poised between empirical and normative dimensions of analysis. It proposes a theory of the practice of preventive foresight based upon already existing struggles and discourses, at the same time as it advocates the adoption of certain principles that would substantively thicken and assist in the realization of a sense of responsibility for the future of humankind. I will thereby proceed in four steps, beginning with a consideration of the shifting socio-political and cultural climate that is giving rise to farsightedness today (I). I will then contend that the development of a public aptitude for early warning about global cataclysms can overcome flawed conceptions of the future’s essential inscrutability (II). From this will follow the claim that an ethos of farsighted cosmopolitanism - of solidarity that extends to future generations - can supplant the preeminence of ‘short-termism’ with the help of appeals to the public’s moral imagination and use of reason (III). In the final section of the paper, I will argue that the commitment of global civil society actors to norms of precaution and transnational justice can hone citizens’ faculty of critical judgment against abuses of the dystopian imaginary, thereby opening the way to public deliberation about the construction of an alternative world order (IV).